The Organic Roots of Conatus in Early Greek Thought by Kirby, Christopher
   
   




  The Organic Roots of Conatus in Early Greek
Thought




  Copyright © 2021 Christopher Kirby 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Kirby, C. (2021). The Organic Roots of Conatus in Early Greek Thought. Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 6(2), 29-49.
doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/cjp.26601
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:07:55 |
The Organic Roots of Conatus in 
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Abstract
The focus of this paper will be on the earliest Greek treatments of impulse, motivation, and 
self-animation – a cluster of concepts tied to the hormē-conatus concept. I hope to offer 
a plausible account of how the earliest recorded views on this subject in mythological, 
pre-Socratic, and Classical writings might have inspired later philosophical developments 
by establishing the foundations for an organic, wholly naturalized approach to human 
inquiry. Three pillars of that approach which I wish to emphasize are: practical intelligence 
(i.e., a continuity between knowing and doing), natural normativity (i.e., a continuity 
between human norms and the environment), and an ontology of philosophical dialectic 
(i.e., a continuity between the growth of human understanding and the growth of physis).
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I. Introduction: Nature’s persistence through change
Philosophers have long hoped to integrate the impulses of human behavior within the movements of the natural world. It could be said that philosophy itself commenced when a handful of thinkers in the 
Greek colonies of Asia Minor began to look for explanations for the natural 
processes – or physis (φύσις) – around them. The philosophers that Aristotle 
called physikoi “looked at the world with the steady gaze that did not see any 
part of it as separate and cut off from the rest, but always as an element in a 
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living whole, from which it derived its position and meaning.”1 They did not 
feel the need to question the veracity of their interactions with the world, and 
therefore did not speak in terms of “experiences,” as later Renaissance and 
Enlightenment thinkers would. Instead, the Greeks spoke in terms of organic 
objects, endowed with powers of self-animation, capacities to act, and 
potentialities to fulfill. As Aristotle explained in the Physics, natural things: 
present a feature in which they differ from things which are 
not constituted by nature. For each of them has within itself a 
principle of motion […]. On the other hand, a bed and a coat and 
anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations – i.e., 
in so far as they are products of art – have no innate impulse 
[hormê] to change […] that nature is a source or cause of being 
moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, 
in virtue of itself.2 
It is interesting to note how the English word “nature” is not a perfect analog 
for the Greek conception of physis, which carries a connotation of organic 
growth – evident in English as the root of words like “physics” or “physiology.” 
By contrast, “nature” is derived from the Latin natura, which connotes a 
completed, after-product of “birth,” apparent through its connection with 
words like “nativity” and “prenatal.” Because of its implicit view of nature as 
dynamic and growth-oriented, Greek philosophy posited an inherent impulse 
from which all motion (both human and natural) derived. This concept was 
known as hormê (ὁρμή) and was even more difficult to capture fully in Latin 
translations.3
As Rome transitioned from republic to empire, Greek physis was 
increasingly associated with Latin natura and Greek hormê with Latin conatus 
essendi. Although Roman thinkers largely lacked the same implicit growth-
principle in their concept of nature, they still made heavy reference to conatus 
and its synonym impetus. In fact, wherever intellectual achievement occurred 
for the next millennium, some notion of self-animation – whether conative in 
1 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: Volume I. Archaic Greece: The Mind of 
Athens, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), xx.
2 Aristotle, Physics, 192b12-24. 
3 Even Cicero, who was celebrated for his talent in translating Greek, struggled to find a 
phrase to adequately capture it. As John Glucker notes: “Cicero has no fewer than five [Greek-
into-Latin remarks] on this term: Luc. 24. Fin. III.23 (“adpetitio animi”); Fin.V.17 (“adpetitus 
animi”); Fin. IV.39 (“naturalis adpetitio”); ND II.58 (“conatus et adpetitio”);” cf. John Glucker, 
“Cicero’s Remarks on Translating Philosophical Terms – Some General Problems,” in Greek 
into Latin from Antiquity until the Nineteenth Century, eds. John Glucker, and Charles Burnett 
(London; Turin: The Warburg Institute; Nino Aragno Editore, 2012), 45.
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name or in theory – seems to have been in play. It percolated through the Neo-
platonic and neo-Aristotelian writings of the medieval period; motivated the 
mechanics of Galileo, Thomas Hobbes, and René Descartes; engendered the 
cosmologies of Vico, Spinoza, and Leibniz; animated the theories of “will to 
life” and volition in late German idealism, and undergirded notions of instinct 
at the beginnings of modern psychology. It can even be found today as a key 
concept in theories of neurobiology (e.g. Antonio Damasio’s somatic marker 
theory), ecology (e.g. the deep ecology movement inspired by Arne Næss), 
educational theory (through the works of Maria Montessori) and perhaps 
even evolutionary biology, if one takes heed of what Richard Dawkins has 
written about memes and selfish genes. In fact, it could be argued that the 
horm ê-conatus concept is one of the most successful memes in the history of 
philosophy. 
Perhaps one reason for this successful self-replication is how useful 
the idea is in dealing with a longstanding philosophical problem – viz. the 
reconciliation of change and permanence. Nearly every ancient Greek 
philosopher tried to find some semblance of order in the chaos of their world. 
Theirs was a maritime culture, built by the chapped hands and weathered 
brows of sailors. The early Greeks were a people who understood all too 
well how quickly clear skies can darken and tranquil conditions take a turn for 
the worse and, to this day, that anyone on a long, arduous journey fraught 
with danger is said to be on an odyssey. While philosophers like Heraclitus 
and Parmenides, or Democritus and Aristotle may not have faced the literal 
precariousness endured by Odysseus, they did witness the kinds of political 
and social upheaval that forces one to cast about for answers. 
When one is on that kind of intellectual quest, it seems natural to 
wonder if things really are as they seem. This is why so many of the Greek 
philosophers questioned the distinction between appearance and reality. They 
wondered if there was some archē underlying the world they experienced, and 
so, they posited that logos might be one way to organize all of the noise into 
one coherent theoria. Regardless of how an individual philosopher worked 
through those questions, the underlying assumption was always that human 
understanding was part and parcel of this larger picture, not separate from it, 
and the most successful ideas were the ones which posited human reason as a 
movement within the movements of the world. 
We face a similar uncertainty in our own time, but perhaps there is insight 
waiting for us in the ancient roots of the conatus idea. That is why the focus 
of this paper will be on the earliest Greek treatments of impulse, motivation, 
and self-animation – a cluster of concepts tied to the horm ê-conatus concept. 
I hope to offer a plausible account of how the earliest recorded views on 
this subject in mythological, pre-Socratic, and Classical writings might have 
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inspired later philosophical developments by establishing the foundations for 
an organic, wholly naturalized approach to human inquiry. Just three pillars 
of that approach which I wish to emphasize here are: practical intelligence 
(i.e., a continuity between knowing and doing), natural normativity (i.e., a 
continuity between human norms and the environment), and an ontology 
of philosophical dialectic (i.e., a continuity between the growth of human 
understanding and the growth of physis). 
 
II. Impulse, action, and practical intelligence in mythological Greece
Despite the distinction Aristotle drew in his Metaphysics between the mythologoi 
and physiologoi,4 I believe a study such as this one must adopt a pluralistic approach 
that breaks from the philosophical tendency which separates logos from mythos. In 
Greek mythology, the daimona Hormê was an energetic activity personified and, 
as Pausanias (c. 110-180 CE) recounted, there was an altar dedicated to her in the 
Athenian agora.5 With regard to warfare, Hormê was understood as the outset of 
an attack or assault and, in this sense, could be associated with Eris, the daimona 
of strife. Just as Hesiod depicted two types of Eris in his Works and Days,6 there 
appears to have been at least two sorts of Hormê in the theogonic usage, one 
associated with marching into battle and the other with productive diligence. The 
latter sense appears frequently in Homer’s works (particularly the Odyssey), where 
it is associated with its corresponding verb form horma-ô (to urge, to start, to 
rush) and the subsequent derivation hormain-ô (to deliberate, to ponder).7 Thus, it 
appears that hormê in the Homeric usage, could also be associated with practical 
intelligence, something later Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, held in high 
esteem. This may be one reason hormê became so prevalent during the Hellenistic 
period, particularly in the Stoic theories of action and the self. Under the Stoic view, 
rational “appearances” or “impressions” (phantasiai), which express 
the way things “look” to human beings, play a crucial role in explaining 
human action. The fact that people “assent” (say yes) to certain types 
of impression, namely those that ascribe value to courses of action, 
is adequate to explain the “impulse” (hormê) to act in a given way.8
4 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983b-984a. This distinction can be seen more sharply where 
Aristotle distinguishes between Homer and Empedocles in Aristotle, Poetics, 1447b17-20.
5 Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.17.1.
6 Hesiod, Works and Days, Lines 11-41.
7 Jeffrey Barnouw, Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer’s 
Odyssey (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004), 116.
8 Christopher Gill, Greek Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9.
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The general weight of scholarly opinion until the latter part of the 20th century 
was that early Greek poetry held no conception of decision making and, ipso 
facto, was unable to present any sort of coherent praxeology.9 The account 
usually offered was a developmental one, from the alleged “primitive” 
understanding of human agency offered in Homer to the “sophisticated, 
volitionalist” views in Plato and Aristotle. However, a handful of scholars 
more recently, for instance Bernard Williams in his Shame and Necessity10 and 
Martha Nussbaum in her Fragility of Goodness,11 have challenged this view. As 
Williams puts it, regardless of whether or not Homer presents a full-fledged 
theory of action, “beneath the terms that mark differences between Homer 
and ourselves lies a complex net of concepts in terms of which particular 
actions are explained, and this net was the same for Homer as it is for us.”12 
Williams argues that, despite the arguments to the contrary, Homer depicts 
the ability of special characters, who possess “an iron thumos,” to act against 
their own urges. Priam’s appearance before Achilles at the end of the Iliad and 
Odysseus’ decision not to kill the handmaidens at the end of the Odyssey 
are paradigmatic cases of Homeric characters showing self-restraint without 
reference to any semblance of rational will. Rather, their restraint is likewise 
said to stem from the thumos itself; these men have the capacity to endure 
against feeling. They have the momentum of a larger, more sustained urge 
that allows them to overcome the lesser, fleeting ones. It is worth noting 
that Williams connects this ability, although in passing, to the Greek verb 
hormainein. 
Taking this etymological connection a bit further in Odysseus, Hero of Practical 
Intelligence, Jeffrey Barnouw situates an analysis of the Homeric conception of 
hormê within a larger discussion of psychological struggle, as depicted during the 
moments of deliberation within the Odyssey to which Williams referred. Barnouw 
echoes Williams in asserting that the poet couched such struggles not in Platonic 
terms of reason versus desire (logos and thumos), but rather one between rival 
impulses.13 In Homer’s account, the practical intelligence Odysseus displays 
consists not in taming the appetites with noble reason, as Plato famously claimed, 
9 Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, LA, and London: University of 
California Press, 1951); Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European 
Thought, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953); Jean-Pierre Vernant, and Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 
1990).
10 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
11 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
12 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 34.
13 Barnouw, Odysseus, 229.
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but is instead a matter of a self-motivated mental fortitude, one that enables him 
to subordinate one impulse to another. According to Barnouw, this aspect of 
Homer’s account is not only a precursor to the Stoic moral psychology found 
in Chrysippus, but also anticipates the theories of Hobbes, Leibniz, C. S. Peirce, 
and John Dewey,14 perhaps best summed up in Peirce’s dictum: “The feeling of 
believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature 
some habit which will determine our actions.”15 Indeed, Barnouw labels Homer’s 
Odysseus a “visceral thinker,” one whose ability to check his own urges (such as 
the urge to kill Polyphemus) stems from thumos (desire, heart), not logos:
the implication in Homer is not that a supervening conscience, a 
“higher faculty,” suppresses impulses coming from some other 
source. The source of action, of checking and enduring as well 
as daring, is thumos, whether as a sudden particular impulse, an 
enduring impulse or a locus of impulses.16 
Barnouw sees this as a shift in views from the Iliad, in which (quoting Hermann 
Frankel), “As soon as [one] knows what has to happen, he needs no further decision 
to move on to the act,” a view which would seem to follow from the popular 
view that Homer had no concept of decision and which informs our contemporary 
befuddled understanding of impulse.17 In opposition to the characters of the Iliad, 
Barnow explains, the Odyssey portrays Odysseus and Penelope as deliberative 
and purposeful and the verb most closely associated in the text with that sort 
of emotional deliberation is, once again, hormainein.18 Although “Homer seems 
to insist on the continuity between thinking of doing something and the impulse 
to do it,” the cunning of Odysseus he praises is precisely his ability to subsume 
immediate impulses (e.g. revealing himself to Penelope before encountering the 
suitors) under a long term impulse (ridding Ithaca of the suitors once and for all). 
Barnouw explains:
This element of incipience in hormaô is important to the role of urge 
or impulse in deliberation, as it allows that what is being pondered 
are not merely ideas or possible acts but active tendencies, the 
beginnings of the acts themselves.19
14 Ibid., 2.
15 Charles S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (1877): 1.
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Barnouw holds up Poseidon’s final assault on Odysseus at 5.365 as the prime 
example. The Butler translation reads: “While he was thus in two minds, 
Poseidon sent a terrible great wave” however, the key terms in the Greek here 
are, once again, hôrmaine (to ponder, to turn over) and thumon, which should 
tip the reader off that Homer’s view is not as logo-centric as the translator 
implies.20 Barnouw shows how the poet brings together several sorts of urges 
under the same term, “linking hormaô and hormê to hormainô.” He concludes: 
[Odysseus’] physical effort (hormê, 416) against the great 
wave, and his mental visceral activity, ‘pondered’ (hormaine, 
424), work in parallel […]. The reciprocity of man and nature in 
struggle, driven in different ways by the gods, is captured by the 
repeated mirroring of the related terms.21 
Three points can be drawn from this connection between hormê, hormaô, and 
hôrmaine. First, there is a connection in Homer between human impulses and 
those of the natural world, one that points beyond a simple “man vs. nature” 
narrative toward a more naturalized praxeology, if not invoking harmony with 
nature, at least one of mutual adjustment. Second, there is the absence of a 
logo-centric theory of action, one that pits reason against the passions or the 
appetites. Finally, as the upshot of these first two points, arises a suspicion 
about the old distinction between mythos and logos, between poetry and 
philosophy. Even though, as Bruce Lincoln puts it:
Heroic accounts of […] the beloved Greek Miracle, regularly grant 
a prominent place to the transformation in speech and thought 
that led from the mythos of Homer and Hesiod to the logos 
of Heraclitus and Plato, a transformation associated with the 
move from symbolic to rational discourse, anthropomorphism 
to abstraction, and religion to philosophy. […] the story is hardly 
as simple as it is often made out to be.22
The developmental theories of Greek notions of self tend to go hand in 
hand with this tidy narrative Lincoln calls into question. In a similar critique, 
Kathryn Morgan writes:
20 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Samuel Butler (Ottawa: East India Publishing Company, 2020), 
45.
21 Ibid., 119.
22 Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1999), 3.
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Logos, conceived as intellect, is present in the earliest preserved 
Greek literature. Homeric gods as civilized and ‘rational,’ and 
the beginnings of theodicy, are traced in the Odyssey […]. To 
an even greater degree, Hesiod’s Theogony strives towards 
systematization and rational regulation of life. One may 
envisage a broad movement from irrationality to rationality, but 
the precise moment and nature of the boundary between the two 
mental states is hard to specify. No myth is totally irrational; 
no philosophy (at least before Aristotle) is totally devoid of 
mythical elements.23  
It is just this sort of striving towards systematization and regulation of 
life (whether “rational” or not) that I believe linking the impulses between 
humanity and nature could accomplish. This is where one might consider 
Hesiod’s account of Strife in both Works and Days and Theogony.24 For 
instance, at Theogony we find: “But abhorred Strife bore painful Toil and 
Forgetfulness and Famine and tearful Sorrows, Fightings also, Battles, 
Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lying Words (Logoi) [and] Disputes.”25 
Logos, for Hesiod, is associated with the loathsome sort of Strife. In fact, 
both Theogony and Works and Days contain passages connecting logos 
to seduction, falsehoods, cunning, and the discourse of the weak.26 The 
duality of Strife presented in Works and Days builds upon this association. 
Destructive Strife stems from quarrels, lawsuits, and war, but the constructive 
sort, which Hesiod claims is born of night, is responsible for the zelôs (zeal) 
between neighbors. Competition and emulation of like with like, he says, “is 
wholesome for men.”27 How much of this idea is handed down to the early 
philosophers is, of course, hard to say. However, there appear to be several 
recurring themes here picked up by pre-Socratic writers. 
III. Nature, norms, and humanity in the pre-Socratics
It is well known that many of the earliest Greek philosophers, from the 
Milesian monists to the atomists, sought a solution to the persistence-
23 Kathryn A. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 32.
24 Here I am setting aside the issues of textual interpolation from later rhapsodes, which is only 
obliquely relevant to an analysis of the transmission of ideas I have in mind.
25 Hesiod, Theogony, Lines 226-229.
26 Cf. Lincoln, Theorizing Myth, 11.
27 Hesiod, Works and Days, Line 24.
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through-change quandary. However, the issue is typically couched in terms 
of substance ontology. If one were to focus not on the substances, but 
rather on the processes in pre-Socratic metaphysics, on that which is dynamic 
rather static, could new insights be gleaned? Those thinkers whose work 
united both the epistemic, and psychological sense of hormê found in Homer 
with the theogonic, and metaphysical sense embedded in Hesiod might be 
most relevant to such an investigation. Xenophanes may have achieved 
something like this in his cyclical cosmology, combining a rejection of the 
Greek mythological pantheon in favor of a singular god. Likewise, Heraclitus 
brought together logos and eris in his predilection for change and, despite his 
derision toward his predecessor, wound up with a depiction of the divine quite 
similar to Xenophanes. Parmenides’ doxa also holds striking similarities to 
Xenophanes, insofar as it presents a theory of recurrent cosmological mixture 
of two primary bodies. Empedocles presents an even more interesting study, 
as it is he, who first offered something of a forerunner to Aristotle’s four 
elements, posited two primordial daimones (eros and eris) which initiated the 
cosmic cycle, and claimed that cathartic purification could lead one through 
a process of reincarnation toward a state of divine intelligence. 
In the interest of brevity, I will try to cast a synoptic look at the 
evolution of the three main points I find running through the four pre-
Socratics just named (to recapitulate: a theory of intelligent action driven by 
an inner, natural impulses, a normative view of nature, and an ontology of 
philosophical dialectic). Along the way, the themes which connect them to 
their mythopoetic forbears should likewise become clearer. Generally speaking, 
the thinkers I have selected are prime examples of a pre-Socratic view which 
situates norms of psychological, ethical, and political life within the whole of 
nature. It should be noted (following Julia Annas and Christopher Gill) that 
despite being framed with an intimate connection between normative ideals 
and “physicalist”28 thoughts about nature, such a view is not necessarily on 
par with contemporary understandings of physicalism, materialism, or ethical 
naturalism precisely because “the idea of nature [did not function] for them 
as a norm within ethical theory.”29 Simply put, pre-Socratic normative nature 
is not subject to Moore’s open question argument because it is not involved 
in trying to convince anyone that it is rational to be morally good. Instead, 
thinkers like Heraclitus and Empedocles see normative ideals (e.g., friendship, 
harmony) as applying to nature, and they claim that the person who recognizes 
28 Julia Annas states, “In its ancient form, physicalism is the theory that everything that exists, 
including the soul, falls under phusikê, enquiry into the constituents and structures of the 
universe;” Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University 
of California Press, 1992), 3.
29 Gill, Greek Thought, 69-70.
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this will experience a type of ethical and psychological growth. In this way, 
the poet-Muse relationship informs the new vision of reality which many of 
the pre-Socratics wish to communicate.30 
As a rhapsode who also wrote against the epic poets, Xenophanes’ life 
is symbolic of the complex transition from the Archaic to the Classical ages. 
He sought to preserve only the sorts of poetry which offered either a true 
description of the universe or held some social utility. Though he valued the 
mythic tradition, he was skeptical of humanity’s ability to garner knowledge 
from it and rebuked the Homeric and Hesiodic portrayals of the gods for 
demonstrating the worst features of human frailty. In this way, Xenophanes 
offered not a different account of the mythological universe he inherited, but 
rather an account of a wholly different universe. He claims that if oxen and 
horses could paint gods, they would make them look like horses and gods. 
He claims everything is born of earth and water, the admixture of which are 
the two primary bodies in a cyclical cosmogonic process, whose impulse is 
the mental power of a singular, completely whole god. Human actions, it 
is implied, are imperfect reflections of this process and a harmony can be 
achieved only if one is able to hear the “true words” of mythic poetry – i.e., 
those elements which maintain social decorum. Xenophanes anticipated what 
some have called “the god of the philosophers” – that is, a purely abstract, 
motionless and unknowable entity. He, thus, likewise set up the distinction 
between true opinion and knowledge that would be heavily employed by 
Plato. 
Perhaps because he was a writer of prose, Heraclitus had an even graver 
outlook on the poets. He was deliciously cantankerous, and it is probably 
safe to say he was the most iconoclastic of all the early Greek iconoclasts. He 
called the epic poets fools and Pythagoras a fraud. His view of the relationship 
between mythos and logos appears, at first blush, to differ greatly from that 
of Xenophanes – since he is well known as an early champion of the logos and 
never once is mythos mentioned in his extant fragments. However, there are 
several points of connection. First, it is the variety of functions logos holds 
for Heraclitus. In one instance it is treated as a principle of cosmic order, in 
another as the core of philosophical discourse, and yet another as “the one 
wise” who allows himself to be called Zeus. Like Hesiod, Heraclitus gives 
Strife a prominent role, holding the tension between opposites essential for 
cosmic harmony. 
A widely held interpretation of the phrase “παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ 
τόξου καὶ λύρης” in fragment 51 sees it as suggesting a tension between two 
opposite but equal vectors, or a “connection working in both directions.”31 
30 Cf. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 46-88. 
31 Quoted in Edward Hussey, The Pre-Socratics (London: Duckworth, 1972), 43.
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The Greek in this fragment, however, has been a source of dispute among 
specialists for two reasons. The first conflict surrounds the proper 
understanding of harmoniê as Heraclitus would have meant it. During the 
time of Homer, harmoniê would have held the meaning of “fitting together” 
into a structure and was often used in reference to masonry and carpentry, but 
also in reference to military treaties – a meaning the English word “accord” 
might best capture.32 However, by the time Heraclitus would have been 
writing, the word had also taken on the association with music that its English 
cognate holds today, which could suggest the give-and-take of resonance, or 
mutual reverberation. This meaning also seems to fit within the context of 
the fragment itself and the representations of the cosmos it employs – viz. a 
bow and a lyre. The second component of the dispute surrounds the choice 
of the word palintropos – which could be translated as “back turning.” The 
received version of the fragment was unclear here though, and some scholars 
have suggested that the word intended was instead palintonos – which could 
be translated as “back stretching.” Edward Hussey has suggested,
If palintonos is correct, then the bow and lyre are thought 
of as not functioning, but at rest and in a state of tension, as 
indeed they both are when strung. If this is so, then the unity 
of opposites expresses itself in a static state, an equilibrium in 
which the opposed forces balance each other.33
Hussey continues, “If palintropos is correct, then the bow and the lyre 
are thought of as in use. Their proper functioning implies the movement 
in opposite or alternate directions of their complicated structure.”34 If 
the intended meaning of this passage was a “back-turning” (in alternating 
resonance) then we might be better off to adopt a view centered on the notion 
of dual-oscillation. This calls to mind the way that Karl Popper suggested we 
read Heraclitus – i.e. as a precursor to process philosophy, but a process in 
which logos is understood as an emergent law, rather than some sort of static 
archê.35 It seems clear Heraclitus deemed the language of the mythic tradition 
as conceptually inadequate to convey this message. For him, the sort of logos 
he had in mind should have been apparent and a source of harmony, because 
it was common to all, but it had been ignored by those claiming simplicity. 




35 Cf. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 1963). 
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both human nature and nature at large. His oracular style appears to be a call 
for just that sort of reflection. Like the other pre-Socratics, Heraclitus found 
himself in the midst of a struggle between narrative and argumentative styles 
of discourse precipitated by the advent of the written word. Like Xenophanes, 
he rejected prior mythopoetic discourse, albeit more explicitly, and should be 
counted as one more step in the shift of discursive authority from narrative 
(thought to be motivated by external forces, i.e. the Muses) to self-motivated 
argument.36 Despite this shift, most of the pre-Socratics sought to appropriate 
mythic authority for their new form of discourse – and this is where Heraclitus 
should be set apart. 
The other two thinkers I wish to highlight can be grouped together 
even more closely, and not simply because of the traditional connection 
often made between Parmenides and Empedocles. As Aryeh Finkelberg has 
argued, Empedocles’ physical doctrine can be viewed as “the final stage of 
a development which can be traced back through Parmenides’ doxa back 
to Xenophanes’ ‘physics.’”37 Drawing upon testimonies from Theophrastus, 
Hippolytus, and Simplicius, she suggests that, like the others, Parmenides 
posited a recurrent cosmological generation and corruption.38 A process 
that, for Parmenides, involved the admixture of night and light and the 
operation of love (eros) and discord (bellum/discordia). In a move reminiscent 
of Hesiod, Parmenides also associated cognition with emulation of like by 
like (this according to Theophrastus). One finds in his doxa, a precursor to 
Empedocles portrayal of love and strife, couched in terms of a daimona which 
governs the recurrent cosmogonical mixture of the two primary bodies. For 
Empedocles, however, human life itself is only a part of this cosmogonical 
dance caused by strife, one in which a miserable cycle of metempsychosis is 
set off due to “false speech.” Like Homer and Hesiod, Empedocles invokes 
the Muse, but his invocation calls for something different – viz. to have logos 
placed in his visceral organs. He sees purification and the ultimate rescue from 
metempsychosis in the combination of poetry and argument where “one may 
become a prophet, singer, doctor, or leader, and eventually a god.”39 It is, of 
course, the relationship between physis and nomos with which these thinkers 
engaged that became a major concern for Socrates and his successors and 
provided Western thought with an enduring idea – that the human body is 
itself a microcosm, or, in other words, a tiny cosmos. Human inquiry, then, 
36 Indeed, it could be said that Aristotle’s syllogism contains a sort of impulse, insofar as the 
conclusion “follows” from the premises. 
37 Aryeh Finkelberg, “Xenophanes’ Physics, Parmenides’ Doxa and Empedocles’ Theory of 
Cosmogonical Mixture,” Hermes 125, no. 1 (1997): 1-16.
38 Ibid.
39 Quoted in Morgan, Myth and Philosophy, 62.
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is not so much a retreat to a “view from nowhere,” but rather an integrated 
part of organic life that seeks to maximize an organism’s functionality with 
its surroundings. The logical extension of such a line of reasoning leads to 
the prospect that human animals are continuous with their surroundings, that 
they are experiencing fields immersed within an environing field.40 
IV. Philosophical conatus and the ontology of dialectic
In March of 2014, Sarah Broadie, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Wardlow 
Professor at the University of Saint Andrews, was invited to give the Howison 
Lecture at Berkeley. The title of her talk was: “The Theoretical Impulse in Plato 
and Aristotle.” In it, she offered a description of philosophical inclination 
couched in terms of moral psychology and painted a beautiful picture of “the 
human being as a theoretical adventurer,” focusing on how Plato and Aristotle 
could be used together, rather than “defend one against the other.”41 In the 
remainder of this paper, I hope to look more deeply at the underlying causes 
for the human impulse to philosophize. Like Broadie, I will attempt to marry 
aspects of Plato to Aristotle, not strictly in the interest of equity, but in order 
to accentuate something of the organic attitude which underlies their thinking. 
Among the many conclusions Broadie drew, two stand out. Firstly, while 
Plato’s philosophical exemplar is the one that frees herself and others from 
impediments to intellectual progress, Aristotle’s is the one that is actually 
experiencing the moment of discovery. This suggests that the ultimate 
philosophical goal for Aristotle is the act of inquiry, while for Plato it is 
the “condition of not being hobbled by delusions.” This jibes well with the 
traditional depictions of each: Plato the educator and Aristotle the scientist. 
According to those depictions, Plato hoped philosophers would remove 
delusions in others, while Aristotle hoped they would discover (and rediscover) 
insights, in perpetuity. Apparently, for Plato, the state of philosophical health is 
more important than the moment of recovery from delusion, and, for Aristotle, 
the state of philosophical health is just a continuous series of such recoveries. 
The drive to philosophize for Plato seems to come from the nourishment one 
receives from a clear vision of ideas. For Aristotle, it is inherent (“by nature”) to 
our biology as a species. I find each of these answers, by itself, lacking. I shall 
return to this criticism in a moment. 
40 This way of stating the continuity between humans with their environments is employed by 
Paul Kurtz in his essay, “Naturalism in American Philosophy,” in Philosophy and the Civilizing 
Arts: Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider, eds. Craig Walton, and John P. Anton (Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press, 1974).
41 Sarah Broadie, “The Theoretical Impulse in Plato and Aristotle,” filmed March 19, 2014, 
at Berkeley Graduate Lectures, Berkeley, CA, video, 59:52, https://gradlectures.berkeley.edu/
lecture/plato-aristotle/.
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The second point that stood out in Broadie’s talk was a suggestion that Plato’s 
approach, i.e., of clearing delusions by use of the intellect, when taken to its logical 
conclusion, might lead to a deep-seated distrust of reason. After all, if intellect 
is used to clear away the impediments produced by the intellect, there arises an 
obvious circularity. When the intellect is turned inward, on itself, it might foster a 
solipsistic kind of skepticism. After all, reflectivity seems to go hand in hand with 
reflexivity. However, despite the long history of this tendency, it may actually be 
traceable to a wholly contingent transition that occurred in ancient Greece between 
the seventh and fourth centuries BCE. As Eric Havelock has put it,
The Socratic dialectic was introduced into Greek culture […] at 
precisely that time when the slow transition of [cultural] storage 
speech away from the [poetic, oral] version and towards a mastery of 
the [conceptual and literate] had reached a crisis.42
Plato stands out among the greatest of philosophers in part because his corpus 
consisted in a documentation of the Socratic dialectic that was one of the first and 
still one of most ingenious responses to this reflexivity paradox. Havelock again:
The dialectic was logos, yet remained exclusively oral, not out of 
eccentric choice, but because its practitioner [Socrates] grew up as an 
oralist, a traditionalist, who yet committed himself to a paradoxical 
task.43
At once method and ontology, understanding the interplay and unity of opposites 
that is dialectic has been the cornerstone of some of the most insightful additions 
to Western civilization. I believe this legacy is, simultaneously, the greatest 
inspiration and the biggest stumbling block for countless philosophers. I hope to at 
least diagnose one facet of the difficulty. I believe the answer has something to do 
with that first impulse a budding philosopher feels to venture into the theoretical. 
This is of course another one of those perennial problems of philosophy; 
and as a solution, many of the earliest Greek thinkers posited an inherent 
42 Eric A. Havelock, “The Orality of Socrates and the Literacy of Plato: With some Reflections 
on the Historical Origins of Moral Philosophy in Europe,” in New Essays on Socrates, ed. 
Eugene Kelly (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 74. 
43 Ibid., 77. Later, he writes: “The pioneers preferred to adapt old terms, rather than invent 
new ones. Noein, to be aware or sensible of, phronein, to have wits, logizesthai, to tally, 
skopein to look at, epistasthai, to get on top of (in mastering a skill) were converted to the 
senses of thinking, reasoning, analyzing, understanding scientifically, and the corresponding 
nouns, phronesis, episteme, nous, dianoia (thought, science, mind, intellect) began to turn into 
indexes of sheer thought and abstract intellection […]. In oral language the actions of agents 
commonly acted upon something; the subject did something to an object. But here was a new 
kind of action, namely sheer intellection, which perhaps was not an action at all;” Ibid., 81. 
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impulse from which movement (both human and natural) could be derived. 
To illustrate what I wish to pursue, I should like to consider Plato’s ideas 
concerning education, especially in the story known as the “Allegory of the 
Cave.” When reading his allegory of the cave in terms of education, I find it 
curious that Plato would give an elaborate account of the learning process 
(especially when his metaphor is extended) yet provide no machinery to start 
the journey. On one hand, this may only be another indication of Plato’s 
philosophical assumptions; on the other, it could be an intentional omission, 
itself symbolic of a philosophical truth. The difference that makes a difference 
here, I must concede, hangs on an interpretive choice – but one that I believe 
is warranted. 
Much has been made of the allegory’s political and epistemological 
symbolism. Likewise, because Plato believed that education was such an 
essential component in realizing his ideal individual/city, nearly as much has 
been said about this allegory with regard to the philosophy of education. 
However, in the true spirit of “allegory,” or ἄλλος ἀγορεύω, I should like to 
suggest a “different” way of reading the story which places the metaphor 
in “wide open (conceptual) space.”44 Thus, before we delve too deeply into 
the upshots of that choice, let me first recount the story, holding it under a 
somewhat novel light.
The allegory begins when Socrates turns to the concept of παιδεία: 
“Next,” I said, “compare the effect of education (παιδεία) and the lack of it 
on our nature to an experience like this.”45 The reference to paideia is worth 
noting, not only because we see Socrates begin Book VII with his second 
account of education within the ideal city, but also because of the connection 
to the previous book’s analogies of the sun and divided line, in which a kind 
of enlightenment – or highest form of knowledge – is presented. Depending 
on the context, Plato used the Greek terms φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, and διάνοια 
interchangeably to stand for enlightenment, but in each case the value rested 
at the pinnacle of dialectical progress that transcended the commonplace. 
This is interesting because, on the one hand, paideia could be understood 
as an across-the-board term for the conventions of a society, as well as the 
process by which those values are transmitted. In this sense, paideia refers 
to a lifelong edification, one which entails both what is called in English 
education and culture, a sort of “building up” of ideals. Yet, on the other 
hand, enlightenment for Plato was: 
44 In Greek, “ἀλληγορία” (allegoria) is “veiled language, figurative,” from “ἄλλος” (allos), 
“another, different” + “ἀγορεύω” (agoreuo), “to harangue, to speak in the assembly” and that, 
in turn, from “ἀγορά” (agora), “assembly.” 
45 Plato, Republic, 514a. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:07:55 |
[ 44 ]
CHRISTOPHER KIRBY THE ORGANIC ROOTS OF CONATUS IN EARLY GREEK THOUGHT
[…] the intellectual virtue of the philosopher. It [was] to have 
the intellectual virtue of the person who has come to grasp the 
nature of the unchanging Forms. This philosopher’s knowledge 
is both scientific and theoretical, since it constitutes the grasp of 
the unchanging realities through which all other things become 
known.46
Therefore, we see in this first line of the allegory two ideas being placed in 
juxtaposition: conventional, communal paideia and transcendent, individual 
enlightenment. 
Taking this as our cue, we might look at the rest of the allegory with 
an aim to decipher its symbolism. It is rather uncontroversial, in light of its 
similarity to the caves of Orphic stories and to the grotto of Empedocles, 
to suggest that Plato’s cave is meant to represent the ignorance of the 
mundane, in this case that of those who have not yet received philosophical 
initiation. But, what shall we make of the rest of the scene? It seems the cave 
itself is representative of “state sanctioned education,” or what we might 
call schooling today, understood in opposition to “self-directed inquiry.” 
In Athens, this was the type of education for which young Athenians paid 
men like Gorgias or Protagoras handsomely. It also reflects what is described 
earlier, by Socrates, regarding the education of auxiliaries and the first part 
of a guardian’s schooling within the model city. That the cave is only partially 
illuminated by a dim fire might be symbolic of the inadequacy of this form 
of education in divulging the truths of enlightenment. For those of us who 
teach ideas for a living, it is all too clear how difficult it is to impart critical 
inquiry to our students. Unless they take it upon themselves to reach for it, it 
may never be handed down. Many are more interested in receiving brute facts 
than in trying to see for themselves how the facts hang together. Part of the 
problem, for us and for the teachers of Plato’s day, is that our best efforts 
are often concealed, as if behind a low-lying wall, by cultural traditions and 
norms, which often preclude students from seeing their lessons clearly. At 
best, one can offer them mere shadows of the ideas one wishes to convey. 
Furthermore, students are often just as bound by the egoism, prejudices, and 
skepticism of conventional society as the prisoners are by their chains in the 
allegory. Of course, those who taught ideas for a living, in Plato’s day, were 
known as the Sophists. If we continue our extension of the metaphor, we 
might say that they are represented by the merchants, hocking their wares on 
the path between the fire and the wall.47 Notice that we modern teachers are 
46 Lawrence Becker, and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol. 3, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 1314.
47 Any symbolism is dismissed here: “The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery 
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in a position similar to theirs. Perhaps this could tell us something about how 
Plato would view the over-professionalization of philosophy today. 
When one of the prisoners in the story is suddenly freed, he quickly sees 
the inadequacies of this system. Fear, anger, and resentment would very likely 
be his natural reaction. In our contemporary schools, is it any wonder that 
the brightest students are often those who match this description and are 
frequently the ones given medication and told simply to “calm down?” The 
freed prisoner quickly makes his way toward a more brilliant source of light, 
the sun, at the mouth of the cave. He emerges from the cave of ignorance, 
and through a slow, arduous process of dialectical edification, he reaches an 
understanding of the good itself. He is enlightened – or so the story goes. But 
how was he freed? Plato does not tell us. He does imply that it is an impulse at 
515c when he writes that something “suddenly compels” (ἀναγκάζω ἐξαίφνης) 
the prisoner, “by nature” (φύσις).48 This should be a matter of no small concern 
for us. If dialectic is the path one must traverse to become a philosopher, 
then how does one break the bonds of ignorance and convention and start 
on that journey? How does one break into dialectic? From what’s been said 
here it should seem obvious that philosophical education is a voyage of self-
discovery as well as a discovery of the self. To illustrate, consider the insights 
of the late political scientist, Michael Oakeshott, who wrote of education,
A human life is not [merely] a process in which a living organism 
grows to maturity, succeeds in accommodating itself to its 
surroundings or perishes. It is, in the first place, an adventure 
in which an individual consciousness confronts the world he 
inhabits, responds to what Henry James called “the ordeal of 
consciousness,” and thus enacts and [through enacting, only 
then] discloses himself.49
In the same way that one cannot simply say, “Today I will become a 
philosopher,” it does not seem possible to take it upon ourselves to begin 
the task of reflection. It is an act that is only available to us after we have 
disclosed ourselves through the context of harmony with the world around 
us. In this way, the human conatus toward personal growth is an outgrowth 
of the conative principles of nature. 
of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the 
things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, 
εἰκόνες;” Plato, Republic, 7.514b.
48 Plato, Republic, 515c.
49 Michael Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 
3, nos. 3-4 (1982): 74.
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If we keep in mind that both the Symposium and Parmenides place Socrates 
in the position of interlocutor, we might consider this to be something of an 
origin story for the philosopher. It is also important to note that Parmenides 
tells Socrates that his objections to the Theory of Forms must be overcome, 
lest we lose the ability to carry on discourse50 and that Diotima told Socrates 
all other loves are just defective forms of philosophy.51 So maybe the idea 
that unites these dialogues is that the student of philosophy is attracted to, 
and strives after, enlightenment but never actually obtains it. Perhaps ideas 
are beautiful objects of philosophical affection that constantly move away 
from their suitors. The point is not the destination, but the pursuit. We must 
remain forever “in between.” If we consider what lies “in between” wisdom 
and a lack of understanding not as a static position, but rather as a dynamic 
process, we may be offered some insight into how Socrates, the lover of 
wisdom, might serve as a model for the rest of us who claim to be lovers of 
wisdom. This is the point of Socratic dialectic, viz. the move from a desire to 
know toward the fulfillment of that desire. But, unlike bodily desire, which 
results either in satisfaction or frustration, intellectual desire has no final 
end. Every culmination must eventually sink back into a new desire. This is an 
important point both theoretically and practically. In this way, the Socratic 
elenchus is the embodiment of the dynamics of hormê. 
It appears Plato may have been cognizant of this. Although he claimed 
each part of the tripartite soul derived from its own hormê, only the impulse 
of logos was qualified to rule – either over the individual or the polis.52 Like 
Homer’s Odysseus, Plato’s philosopher-king is one whose impulses toward 
longer-term, more sustainable goods are able to overcome the impulses 
toward instant gratification.53 Philosophical education, therefore, collapses 
when it seeks only to nurture and individual’s growth toward singular ends, 
in a linear fashion. A proper, nonlinear sort of growth comes about not from 
some teleological design prior to action, but rather emerges through the 
action itself. As I have written elsewhere, 
The difference between linear and non-linear conceptions of 
growth is equivalent to the difference between the progress 
made when traveling toward a set destination and the general 
progress one makes when fitness training. Only in the former 
type of activity is growth measured according to a quantifiable 
50 Plato, Parmenides, 135c.
51 Plato, Symposium, 211d.
52 Cf. Plato, Republic, 409a-410a, and 580d-586d.
53 Cf. Ibid., 603d-606d.
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telos. Yet, when a new indeterminate situation arises, those who 
have experienced non-linear growth, instead, will be able to 
adapt to the changes in the situation like a healthy organism can 
adjust to changes in its environment or a skilled jazz musicians 
can improvise around the notes she hears.54 
This, I believe, is the legacy both of 1) Plato’s freed prisoner, who, once 
suddenly released from his bonds, is compelled to come back to try to free 
others and 2) Aristotle’s empirical philosophy of becoming. The other prisoners 
in the cave cannot hear him because they must grasp for themselves the world 
around them and take the first steps toward becoming philosophers. On such 
a model, a teacher is a guide, a mentor, a midwife – not a leader, or a master, 
or a birth giver. Therefore, the only break involved in entering the dialectical 
process is a break from one’s old habits of thought (and learning to see those 
habits as tied up with one’s own inhabitation) is the initial impulse of that 
process.
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